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Abstract
In German criminal trials, the common law instrument of the guilty plea is unknown. Consequently, one cannot speak of plea bargaining in the strict sense. Nevertheless, informal negotiations, which center on the exchange of a confession for a sentence concession, play an increasing
role in the German criminal process. It is claimed that in today’s Germany “the criminal procedure
cannot be imagined without the phenomenon of informal agreements.” After years of academic debate and developing case law on informal agreements, the German Federal Parliament (Deutscher
Bundestag) has now passed new legislation that regulates agreements and makes them part of the
procedure. As a civil-law country, Germany’s criminal justice system is based on the notion that
the prime task of a criminal trial is to find the material truth.5 Rather than deciding which of the
contesting parties can present the better case, it is the court itself that has to unveil the facts of the
case. Section 244(2) of the German Code of Criminal Procedure reads: “In order to establish the
truth, the court shall, proprio motu, extend the taking of evidence to all facts and means of proof
relevant to the decision.” Finding the truth is an objective goal and not subject to the interests of
the defense or prosecution. Hence, an admission of guilt is not sufficient to convict the defendant.
A confession is rather just one among many forms of evidence and has no procedural function as
such. In particular, it is not sufficient to end or even avoid a trial. Nevertheless, one can find some
kind of negotiation at all stages of the criminal process,which is comparable to Anglo-American
plea bargaining. This Article outlines the development and current practice of informal procedures in Germany and discusses the new procedure introduced in 2009. Part I shows how informal
agreements in Germany—comparable to plea bargaining in common-law systems—have started
to be used on a wider scale. Part II explains the main reasons for the use of informal settlements
in Germany. Part III discusses the procedural framework, looking at the context in which negotiations occur and the possible content of such agreements, and analyzes the main problems of such
agreements. Part IV demonstrates how the German Supreme Court’s failure to restrict the informal
practice finally led to federal legislation—discussed in Part V—to regulate the practice. Part VI
discusses the problem that the development of an informal system, which neither the higher courts
nor the legislature can prevent or control, leads to the question of the relationship between law in
practice and theoretical due process principles. The final part concludes that informal settlements
in Germany, as well as plea bargaining in common-law countries, are a sign of a growing chasm
between theory and practice, which the new German law fails to bridge.

FORMALIZATION OF PLEA BARGAINING IN
GERMANY: WILL THE NEW LEGISLATION BE
ABLE TO SQUARE THE CIRCLE?
Regina E. Rauxloh *
INTRODUCTION
In German criminal trials, the common law instrument of
the guilty plea is unknown. Consequently, one cannot speak of
plea bargaining in the strict sense. Nevertheless, informal
negotiations, which center on the exchange of a confession for a
sentence concession, play an increasing role in the German
criminal process.1 It is claimed that in today’s Germany “the
criminal procedure cannot be imagined without the
phenomenon of informal agreements.”2 After years of academic
debate and developing case law on informal agreements, the
German Federal Parliament (Deutscher Bundestag) has now passed
new legislation that regulates agreements and makes them part
of the procedure.3
As a civil-law country, Germany’s criminal justice system4 is
based on the notion that the prime task of a criminal trial is to
find the material truth.5 Rather than deciding which of the
* School of Law, University of Surrey. The author would like to thank Adrienne
Wilson for her valuable comments on an earlier draft. All translations are the author’s.
RÖNNAU,
DIE
ABSPRACHE
IM
STRAFPROZEß—EINE
1. See
THOMAS
RRECHTSSYSTEMATISCHE UNTERSUCHUNG DER ZULÄSSIGKEIT VON ABSPRACHEN NACH DEM
GELTENDEN STRAFPROZESSRECHT [THE INFORMAL AGREEMENT IN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE—A LEGAL-SYSTEMATIC EXAMINATION OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE
AGREEMENTS IN CURRENT CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW] 249 (1990).
2. Lutz Meyer-Großner, Gesetzliche Regelung der „Absprachen im Strafverfahren?“ [Legal
Regulation of “Agreements in Criminal Proceedings?”],2004 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK
[ZRP] 187, 187.
3. See Gesetz zur Regelung der Verständigung im Strafverfahren [Act for the
Regulation of Agreements in Criminal Proceedings], July 29, 2009,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I, [BGBL. I] at 2353.
4. For an introduction to the German criminal procedure and its main legal
principles, see NIGEL FOSTER, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWS 212–28 (2d ed. 1996).
5. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 26,
1981, 57 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [BVERFGE] 250 (275),
1981.
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contesting parties can present the better case, it is the court itself
that has to unveil the facts of the case. Section 244(2) of the
German Code of Criminal Procedure reads: “In order to
establish the truth, the court shall, proprio motu, extend the taking
of evidence to all facts and means of proof relevant to the
decision.”6 Finding the truth is an objective goal and not subject
to the interests of the defense or prosecution. Hence, an
admission of guilt is not sufficient to convict the defendant. A
confession is rather just one among many forms of evidence and
has no procedural function as such. In particular, it is not
sufficient to end or even avoid a trial. Nevertheless, one can find
some kind of negotiation at all stages of the criminal process,
which is comparable to Anglo-American plea bargaining.
This Article outlines the development and current practice
of informal procedures in Germany and discusses the new
procedure introduced in 2009. Part I shows how informal
agreements in Germany—comparable to plea bargaining in
common-law systems—have started to be used on a wider scale.
Part II explains the main reasons for the use of informal
settlements in Germany. Part III discusses the procedural
framework, looking at the context in which negotiations occur
and the possible content of such agreements, and analyzes the
main problems of such agreements. Part IV demonstrates how
the German Supreme Court’s failure to restrict the informal
practice finally led to federal legislation—discussed in Part V—to
regulate the practice. Part VI discusses the problem that the
development of an informal system, which neither the higher
courts nor the legislature can prevent or control, leads to the
question of the relationship between law in practice and
theoretical due process principles. The final part concludes that
informal settlements in Germany, as well as plea bargaining in
common-law countries, are a sign of a growing chasm between
theory and practice, which the new German law fails to bridge.

6. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], Apr. 7, 1987,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBL. I] 1074, as amended, § 244(2).
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I.

THE BEGINNINGS OF INFORMAL AGREEMENTS IN
GERMANY

As in England and Wales, so in Germany, informal
negotiations initially spread without being noticed. At the time
when the American scholar John Langbein claimed Germany to
be the “land without plea bargaining,”7 informal settlements
were already being used regularly. Although it is very likely that
in some form there have always been informal agreements,8 it is
assumed that regular engagement in such negotiations was
established in large-scale proceedings, such as financial crime,9
tax evasion, environmental crime, and drug related crime10
around the mid-1970s.11 One explanation for the rapid spread of
informal settlements in these areas is that both courts and
prosecution offices became increasingly overworked.12 During
the last four decades, these areas have experienced considerable
growth in the number of criminal cases. Financial crime has been
prosecuted more intensively, and the number of drug offenses
has grown immensely. However, as Rieß has shown, the number
of legal staff has increased accordingly; therefore the rising
number of cases alone does not sufficiently explain the
development of informal agreements.13 Rather than the growing
number of cases, it was the multiplying duration of the individual
7. John H. Langbein, Land without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH.
L. REV. 204, 204 (1979).
8. See Hans-Peter Marsch, Grundregeln bei Absprachen im Strafverfahren [Ground Rules
for Agreements in Criminal Proceedings], 2007 ZRP 220, 220.
9. Wirtschaftskriminalität consists of more crimes than just white-collar crime or
commercial fraud; it also includes, for example, pollution. See LEONARD H. LEIGH &
LUCIA ZEDNER, THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A REPORT ON THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE PRE-TRIAL PHASE IN FRANCE AND GERMANY
40 (1992).
10. See Herbert Landau & Ralf Eschelbach, Absprachen zur Strafrechtlichen
Hauptverhandlung [Agreements about Criminal Trials], 1999 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 321, 321.
11. See Symposium, Deutscher Juristentag: Die Beschlüsse [German Jurists Convention:
The Resolutions], 1990 NJW 2991, 2992.
12. See Raimund Hassemer & Gabriele Hippler, Informelle Absprachen in der Praxis
des Deutschen Strafverfahrens [Informal Agreements in the Application of the German Criminal
Procedure], 1986 STRAFVERTEIDIGER [STV] 360; Georg Küpper & Karl-Christian Bode,
Absprachen im Strafverfahren—Bilanz einer Zehnjährigen Diskussion [Agreements in Criminal
Proceedings—Record of a Ten-Year Discussion],1999 JURA 351, 354.
13. Peter Rieß, Zur Entwicklung der Geschäftsbelastung in der Ordentlichen
Gerichtsbarkeit [About the Development of the Workload of Ordinary Courts], 1982 DEUTSCHE
RICHTERZEITUNG [DRIZ] 201, 201, 464.

2011]

FORMALIZED PLEA BARGAINING IN GERMANY

299

proceedings that led practitioners to look for new means of
coping with the caseload.
The reasons for significantly lengthier trials lie in important
changes in substantive criminal law in these areas. Since the end
of the 1970s, the law on environmental crimes, drug-related
crimes, and financial crimes such as tax or accounting fraud,
have all been developed, amended, and most of all, expanded.14
Arguably, the most important development is the change in actus
reus and causation. In many new offenses, especially in
environmental and financial crime, rather than one single
identifiable action causing harm, the causation of danger itself
has become the actus reus of the offense. The traditional concepts
of conduct or result crimes have been replaced by “causation of
danger crimes.” This makes it extremely difficult to prove the
offense.15 At what point does a legitimate risk become an illegal
danger? What is the scope of causation for that risk? To what
extent did the defendant need to appreciate the risk? In order to
eliminate the problems of evidence, criminal liability has moved
forward on the scale of actions, so that the actus reus is assumed
much earlier in the chain of events.16
The distinction between legal and criminal behavior then
becomes increasingly dependent on the defendant’s state of
mind. For example, an action is deemed dangerous if the
defendant perceived or could have perceived the risk. Without a
confession, proving mens rea requires much indirect evidence.
Investigation in these kinds of crimes calls for the screening of
hundreds of documents and the testimony of dozens of witnesses
(who sometimes have to be brought from abroad as, for example,
when dealing with multinational trade). Consequently, the
length of investigation, as well as of trials where the evidence
needs to be presented and evaluated, has multiplied. The
complex German criminal procedure, with its manifold
procedural safeguards, is not equipped to deal with these new
14. See Joachim Herrmann, Absprachen im Deutschen Strafverfahren [Agreements in
German Criminal Proceedings], 31–32 ARCHIVUM IURIDICUM CRACOVIENSE 55, 56 (2000)
(Pol.).
15. See RÖNNAU, supra note 1, at 45.
16. See KAI-D. BUSSMANN, DIE ENTDECKUNG DER INFORMALITÄT: ÜBER
AUSHANDLUNGEN IN STRAFVERFAHREN UND IHRE JURISTISCHE KONSTRUKTION [THE
DISCOVERY OF INFORMALITY: NEGOTIATIONS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AND THEIR LEGAL
CONSTRUCTION ] 23 (1991).
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requirements of substantive law. Even if the increase in judicial
personnel initially offset the increasing number of cases,17 their
swelling length and intensity has inevitably led to an enormous
overload for the prosecution offices and the courts. Thus, largescale financial crimes are considered the pacesetter, as well as the
principal domain,18 for informal settlements.19
In 1982, a criminal defense lawyer under the pseudonym
Detlef Deal published an article in Germany describing in detail
the common practice of informal negotiations in large-scale
criminal cases.20 He made it very clear that this practice was both
widespread and hidden: “[N]early everybody knows it; nearly
everybody does it, only nobody speaks it out loud.”21 In his view,
the formal trial has degenerated to “a theatre” where the
participants pretend to contribute to the finding of a sentence,
which in reality has already been agreed on by all the parties.
Despite strong criticism from all sides, legal professionals have
not been deterred from engaging in informal settlements. Most
practicing lawyers today agree that courts responsible for trying
financial crimes would not be able to cope with the flood of
large-scale cases if it were not for informal agreements.22 For
example, in the state of Lower Saxony, over eighty percent of
judgments in the area of organized crime are based on informal
agreements.23 Interestingly, informal proceedings have also
spread to less serious crimes,24 but they can even be found today
17. See Hassemer & Hippler, supra note 12.
18. See BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 19 (whose research has shown that in financial
criminal cases the inquisitorial process is a rare exception).
19. Another area is drug-related crime. The growing consumption of drugs since
the end of the 1960s, the increased prosecution since the 1970s, and the increased
criminalization, especially by the 1982 Narcotics Law (Betäubungsmittelgesetz), resulted in
the number of cases and the length of the procedures growing immensely. Id. at 30.
20. Detlef Deal, Aus der Praxis: Der Strafprozessuale Vergleich [In Practice: Settlements in
Criminal Proceedings], 1982 STV 545 (dealing with drug offenses in line with the author’s
field of work).
21. Id. at 545.
22. See Gunter Widmaier, Der Strafprozessuale Vergleich [Settlements in Criminal
Proceedings], 1986 STV 357.
23. Elisabeth Heister-Neumann, Absprachen im Strafprozess—der Vorschlag
Niedersachsens zu einer Gesetzlichen Regelung [Agreements in Criminal Proceedings—Lower
Saxony’s Proposal for Statutory Regulation], 2006 ZRP 137, 137.
24. See Werner Schmidt-Hieber, Verständigungen im Strafverfahren [Agreements in the
Criminal Trial], in ABSPRACHEN IM STRAFPROZEß—EIN HANDEL MIT DER GERECHTIGKEIT?
[AGREEMENTS IN THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS—A BARGAIN WITH JUSTICE?] 52 (1987).
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in serious violent crimes such as rape, aggravated robbery, and
murder,25 although this is still exceptional.26
II. MAIN REASONS FOR INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS
The numerous reasons for the development and spread of
informal negotiations into all areas of criminal law in Germany
can only be summarized here. As in the Anglo-American
discourse, German commentators usually mention the increasing
overwork of courts and prosecution offices as the main reason for
the spread of informal negotiations. Legal experts have no doubt
that criminal procedure would break down without informal
handling of cases.27 Thus it is claimed that informal negotiations
help to sustain and stabilize the current criminal justice system.28
Another major reason is the nature of modern legislation. The
growing complexity of some criminal law areas means that courts
are not just overworked, but actually out of their depth.29
Further, the change from conduct or result crimes to “causation
of danger crimes” means that the outcome of cases is much less
predictable.30 It is this unpredictability that makes pre-trial
agreements compelling for both defense and prosecution. For all
courtroom actors, informal agreements mean easier and faster
completion of the case.
An additional reason for the rise of informal procedures is
the shift in theories of punishment. The traditional idea that the
primary function of punishment is retribution has now been
complemented by the idea of general and specific deterrence.31
25. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH][Federal Court of Justice] Aug. 28, 1997, 43
ENTSCHEDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN STRAFSACHEN [BGHST] 195 (197),

1997; BGH May 13, 1997, 11 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT [NSTZ] 561, 1997;
BGH Oct. 19, 1993, 4 NSTZ 196, 1994.
26. See Joachim Herrmann, Bargaining Justice—A Bargain for German Criminal
Justice?, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 755, 756 (1992).
27. See RÖNNAU, supra note 1, at 20.
28. See Christian Lüdemann & Kai-D. Bussmann, Diversionschancen der Mächitgen?
Eine Empirische Studie über Absprachen im Strafprozeß [Opportunities for Diversion for the
Powerful? An Empirical Study of Agreements in the Criminal Process], 1989
KRIMINOLOGISCHES JOURNAL [KRIMJ] 54, 69.
29. See BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 29.
30. See id. at 25.
31. See Bernd Schünemann, Die Verständigung im Strafprozeß—Wunderwaffe oder
Bankrotterklärung der Verteidigung? [Agreement in the Criminal Process—A Silver Bullet or
Bankruptcy of the Defense?], 1989 NJW 1895, 1898.
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The purpose of deterrence legitimizes time- and cost-saving
procedures as goals of the criminal justice system, as opposed to
the absolute theory of retribution, which is guided by the
considerations of justice only.32 Herrmann points out that the
function of the criminal process is no longer only to enforce the
Penal Code but also to help to find solutions for social
problems.33 According to him, more justice is achieved when all
participants agree on the outcome, and rehabilitation is more
likely to succeed when the defendant accepts the sentence.34 But
agreeing to the mildest sanction possible does not necessarily
mean accepting the judgment; rather it might merely mean
choosing the lesser evil.
Related to the change of sentencing purposes is the
argument that the development of informal proceedings mirrors
the development of a new relationship between state and
citizen.35 The hierarchic interrelation in criminal law between
the powerful state and its subordinate citizens is being replaced
by a co-relation between more equal partners. This different
relationship has long been recognized in administrative law
where the state is in discussion with citizens to find a solution to
the problem rather than exposing them to sanctions as in
criminal law. In criminal law the decisive change again started in
white collar and environmental crime where the newly extended
legislation disregards the principle of ultima ratio.36 Areas
previously dealt with by administrative law, which is open to
negotiations between state and citizen,37 are now subjected to the
inflexible criminal procedural law with its principle of
compulsory prosecution.38
With the increasing complexity of life and society, legislation
expands the scope of the Penal Code to embrace more and more
behaviors, such as forbidden waste disposal, that do not
32. See RÖNNAU, supra note 1, at 61.
33. Herrmann, supra note 26, at 775.
34. Id. at 775–76.
35. See id. at 775.
36. See RÖNNAU, supra note 1, at 45.
37. See Werner Schmidt-Hieber, Absprachen im Strafprozeß—Privileg des
Wohlstandskriminellen? [Agreements in the Criminal Process—Privilege for the White Collar
Criminal], 1990 NJW 1884, 1884.
38. BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 25. Compulsory prosecution is a principle to
protect from arbitrary choice of investigation and means that all crimes should be
prosecuted.
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ordinarily belong to the classical notion of crime.39 Whereas
criminal law traditionally used to deal with deviant behavior
committed by individuals outside or at least at the margins of
society, criminal law now encompasses crimes committed by
individuals in all sectors of society.40 In relation to this, Bussmann
states that the courts tend to be lenient in large-scale proceedings
not only because they are overtaxed with the complexity of the
complicated legal provisions, but also because of classdistinguishing tendencies;41 defendants of fiscal offenses, tax
evasion, or environmental crime are often some of the most
respected members of society from similar backgrounds as
prosecutors and judges. Both of these aspects had an effect on
the criminal process. Whereas criminal procedure traditionally
reflected the subordination of the citizen to the state, a new form
of interaction emerged in which the parties try to solve conflicts
by cooperating and consenting.42 As a result, the defendant’s
autonomy in criminal procedures has increased.43 Informal
agreements reflect this development by replacing formal
accusation and judgment with informal discussion and
negotiations.
III. PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK
It is important to examine how a practice similar to plea
bargaining could be introduced into the German criminal
procedure, which does not recognize the guilty plea. Although
some negotiations are initiated in the context of the main
hearing, many informal agreements are linked to those
procedures that provide the prosecution with some discretion
because they are exceptions to the principle of compulsory
prosecution according to which all crimes must be prosecuted.

39. See Küpper & Bode, supra note 12, at 355.
40. See GÖTZ GERLACH, ABSPRACHEN IM STRAFVERFAHREN: EIN BEITRAG ZU DEN
RECHTSFOLGEN FEHLGESCHLAGENER ABSPRACHEN IM STRAFVERFAHREN [AGREEMENTS IN
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF FAILED
AGREEMENTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS] 23 (1992).
41. BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 29.
42. See Herrmann, supra note 14, at 78.
43. See Schünemann, supra note 31, at 1898.
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One of the core procedures used to open the way for
informal negotiations is the penal order (Strafbefehl).44 Section
407 of the Code of Criminal Procedure gives the prosecutor, in a
case of a misdemeanor, the power to request an order imposing
punishment from the judge if there is sufficient suspicion.45 If the
accused does not appeal, the penal order replaces any further
proceeding and the offender is immediately punished with a fine
or a sentence on probation. Thus it avoids a full trial and comes
very close to the guilty plea in common law systems. Hence it is
not surprising that the penal order is a welcome starting point
for informal negotiations. The defense counsel and prosecutor
might agree that the prosecution will not bring further charges
and request only a penal order if the accused is willing to accept
the punishment suggested by the order.46 Typically, the defense
lawyer and the prosecutor negotiate the amount of the sanction,
with the judge usually agreeing to the order suggested by the
prosecution.47 Today, some thirty-five percent of all cases are
handled through a penal order, and it is realistic to assume that
many of those are based on informal settlements.48
The other major starting point for informal agreements is
dismissal. According to section 153 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, a misdemeanor can be dismissed on the ground of
insignificance by the prosecution with the agreement of the court
if there is only minor culpability and no public interest in
prosecution.49 Once the trial has commenced, the court too can
dismiss the case with the agreement of both the prosecutor and
the defendant. This provision is also an exception to the
principle of compulsory prosecution.
Initially, section 153 could be used only under very
restricted circumstances, and practitioners asked to widen its
remit. At the insistence of the legal community, in 1974 section
153a was introduced in order to fight mass petty crime. This
44. See Werner Schmidt-Hieber, Vereinbarungen im Strafverfahren [Informal
Arrangements in Criminal Proceedings], 1985 NJW 1017, 1017.
45. STPO , Apr. 7, 1987, BGBL. I 1074, as amended, § 407.
46. See Herrmann, supra note 14, at 56.
47. See id. at 66.
48. BERND SCHÜNEMANN, ABSPRACHEN IM STRAFVERFAHREN?—GRUNDLAGEN,
GEGENSTÄNDE UND GRENZEN [AGREEMENTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS?—FOUNDATIONS,
OBJECTS AND LIMITS] B153 n.461 (1990). There are German states where more cases are
handled with the order than by trial. See Herrmann, supra note 14, at 65.
49. STPO, Apr. 7, 1987, BGBL. I 1074, as amended, § 153.
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provision enables the prosecutor to refrain from pressing some
or all charges, even when there is an interest in prosecuting, if
this interest can be overridden by the defendant fulfilling certain
conditions, usually by paying a sum to charity.50 Section 153a was
at first criticized harshly as an “introduction of the American plea
bargaining,” “shady horse trading,” “whispering procedure,” and
“buying-off procedure.”51 However, this rule was not a new
creation. The legislature in fact followed an existing informal
practice to assume that the public interest in prosecution can be
met as soon as the accused obeys the prosecution’s directive. It is
an example of how courtroom actors extended a legal provision
to such an extent that the legislature saw itself compelled to
adjust the law to the lawyers rather than the other way round.
This turned out to become the common pattern for the
development of informal agreements in Germany.
Although the legislature followed the demands of
practitioners and formalized negotiations to some extent,
courtroom actors kept operating beyond the new legal
framework. Section 153a is restricted to misdemeanor offences
and cases with low culpability and strong evidence.
Nevertheless, this provision is excessively used in large-scale
proceedings, which are neither mass nor petty crime,52 and the
restrictions are usually bypassed.53 In 1993, the provision
extended the restriction of minor guilt by stating that “the
seriousness of the guilt does not require the contrary.”54 Once
again, legislation followed the common practice of extending the
criteria beyond the law.55 Section 153a is today frequently used as
a basis for informal settlements. Especially during the
preliminary investigation, it is common for the courtroom actors

50. According to section 153a(2), if there is already an indictment, the court can
take the same decision with the consent of the defendant and the prosecutor. Id. § 153a.
51. See Schmidt-Hieber, supra note 24, at 50.
52. See BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 28.
53. See Herrmann, supra note 26, at 775.
54. STPO, Apr. 7, 1987, BGBL. I 1074, as amended, § 153a. Interestingly, the
legislation did not take this opportunity to address informal settlements one or way or
the other.
55. See Schünemann, supra note 31, at 1896. The same is true for sections 154 and
154a, which are sometimes applied if the court wants to reward a confession or
withdrawal from motion for admission of evidence, even if the requirements are not
strictly fulfilled. See RÖNNAU, supra note 1, at 32.
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to agree that the investigation will cease if the accused pays a
fine.56
In practice, section 153a can be extended to favor or to
disadvantage defendants. It is to their disadvantage that the
application of section 153a violates the rights of the accused in
cases where there is insufficient suspicion of a criminal act,57 and
the presumption of innocence should mean that there is no
prosecution at all. As in England and Wales, the common
practice of exchanging a dismissal for a confession or waiver of
appeal can result in the prosecutor charging a more serious
offense simply to have more substance with which to bargain.58
More often, however, section 153a is extended in favor of the
accused, particularly for economic crimes when section 153a is
applied even when there is more than just minor culpability.59 In
order to do this the case is often redefined to fit the
requirements of section 153a; perjury, for example, might be
reframed as the less serious offense of false unsworn statement.60
A. The Context of Informal Negotiations
Informal settlements in Germany occur most often when the
case involves complicated questions of evidence or law. The more
a court is overworked, the more willing it is to avoid complicated
cases.61 Schünemann found in his research that 77% of judges,
72% of prosecutors, and 51% of defense lawyers favor informal
settlement if the case has difficult legal issues.62 If there are
problems of evidence, 91% of the judges, 90% of the prosecutors,
and 53% of defense lawyers in the study preferred an informal
agreement.63 This is especially true for large-scale proceedings
where countless documents and witness statements have to be
analyzed. Frequently, cases are so technical that the court is
56. See Herrmann, supra note 14, at 56.
57. See SCHÜNEMANN, supra note 48, at B19.
58. See id. at B109.
59. See RÖNNAU, supra note 1, at 37.
60. See Hans Dahs, §153a StPO—ein „Allheilmittel“ der Strafrechtspflege [§153a
Criminal Procedure Code—A “Panacea” for the Criminal Justice System],1996 NJW 1192, 1192.
61. See Deal, supra note 20, at 550.
62. See STEFAN BRAUN, DIE ABSPRACHE IM DEUTSCHEN STRAFVERFAHREN [THE
AGREEMENT IN GERMAN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS] 11 (1998) (summarizing
Schünemann’s research).
63. See id.
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dependent on expensive experts’ statements. All these factors
mean great expense and delay for the trial and increase the
interest in informal procedures.
Further, the relationship between the participants is a
crucial factor in pursuing informal negotiations.64 Like plea
bargaining in England and Wales, informal agreements in
Germany are based on personal relationships of trust. The better
the participants know each other and the more positive their
previous experiences with each other have been, the more
straightforward the negotiations will be. The older the
relationship between the prosecution and defense lawyer, the
more emphasis they will put on cooperation rather than contest.
Sometimes the negotiations even embrace different cases with
different defendants and concessions in one case are rewarded in
another case. This basic element of trust between professionals is
the reason agreements are seldom breached although legally
they are not binding. If, however, the agreement falls apart, the
other parties to the settlement will feel their trust violated and
future negotiations will be threatened.65 Since some private
defense lawyers are dependent on the court to get them
appointed as defense counsels, they are taking a personal risk
that the defendants will keep their promises.66 It is said that some
courts even have “blacklists” of lawyers who did not keep their
agreement. Because of this concern, defense lawyers often do not
let their clients know the details of the deal, so that the
defendants cannot obstruct the negotiations.67 This also prevents
the defendant from complaining if the sentence is higher than
that which was agreed upon by the parties.68
The characteristics of the defendant are likewise decisive.
According to Schünemann’s report, 76% of practitioners stated
that juvenile defendants showed an increased willingness to agree
to informal settlements compared with adult defendants, 89%
confirmed a higher willingness of elderly defendants, and 91%
stated that defendants with no previous conviction are more

64. See id. at 13.
65. See BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 72.
66. In some cases, the defendant changed her defense counsel and appealed
against the sentence, thus breaching the initial promise not to appeal.
67. BGH July 4, 1990, NJW 3030, 1990.
68. See BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 72.
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ready to reach agreements.69 Only 36% of the practitioners
thought that defendants in a weak financial situation would be
willing to reach settlements, and 29% considered that those with
little education would be interested to come to an informal
agreement.70 According to Deal, upper- or middle-class
defendants are more likely to favor reaching settlements with the
court and prosecutors, and judges are more likely to reach an
agreement with the defense lawyer if the defendant appears
sympathetic to the judges.71 Because of courts’ interest in
compensation, white-collar criminals are more likely to be
offered the opportunity to negotiate because they can offer
higher sums.72 Whether the gender of defendant, defense
counsel, judge, or prosecutor plays any role is not addressed in
any empirical research. Another aspect considered by judges and
prosecutors is, as in England and Wales, the victim’s interest,
especially in sexual crimes. Courts also favor informal settlements
that lead to confessions and waivers of evidence production—and
thus protect the victim from having to appear in court and give
evidence.73
Defense lawyers favor settlements especially in cases in which
there is a high probability of conviction (96% of the lawyers in
Schünemann’s survey mentioned this reason).74 Particularly in
this situation, the defense lawyer can gain some reduction of the
sentence in a case that would otherwise be hopeless. An informal
negotiation does not just demonstrate how much influence the
lawyer has in court, but also how the settlement can be sold to
the client as a successful outcome. Other examples of situations
in which defense lawyers favor informal settlements are when
they want to protect their client from public exposure (83%) and
in cases where a high sentence is expected (83%).75
If not all parties favor an agreement, courtroom actors
might employ a number of different strategies in order to impose
69. See BRAUN, supra note 62, at 10–11. However, this is only indirect data, as the
defendants themselves were not asked. This author believes that a public figure is very
much interested in being spared a public trial.
70. Id. at 10.
71. Deal, supra note 20, at 549.
72. See BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 28.
73. See SCHÜNEMANN, supra note 48, at B23.
74. See BRAUN, supra note 62, at 11 (crediting Schünemann’s research).
75. See id.
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pressure on the others to settle. To increase its negotiating
power, the prosecution might “over-charge” the defendant in
order to later be able to offer to withdraw offences from the
accusation.76 Another strategy to put pressure on the defense is
to take advantage of the fact that only the prosecution can
request a dismissal or a penal order. Accordingly, the prosecutor
can combine an offer of dismissal under section 153a with a
warning that this is the last chance for settling.77 Moreover, the
prosecutor can indicate that a refusal to accept an agreement
could lead to a higher sentence recommendation. Obviously, it is
not right to punish the defendant with a more severe sentence
for objecting to a negotiation. However, since the exact final
sentence is nearly impossible to anticipate, it is very difficult to
evaluate whether the final sentence is more severe because of the
earlier rejection to settle. An increased sentence might even be
an unintended consequence.78
Defense lawyers, on the other hand, use the defendant’s
extensive procedural safeguards to threaten the courts with an
enormous number of interim appeal motions and evidenciary
hearings that are expensive and time consuming to initiate an
informal settlement of the case.79 They bombard the court with
motions of different kinds, which the court cannot reject without
risking an appeal. Thus the trial is artificially prolonged, just to
induce settlement in order to shorten the procedure.80 The same
tactic can be used with motions to disqualify the judge.81
Compared to England and Wales, the defense counsel in
Germany is in an advantageous position because it has access to
the prosecution’s dossiers, which are not restricted by disclosure
rules.82
76. See Andrew Ashworth & Meredith Blake, Some Ethical Issues in Prosecuting and
Defending Criminal Cases, 1998 CRIM. L. REV. 16, 28; Christian Lüdemann, Land without
Plea Bargaining? How the Germans Do It. Results of an Empirical Study, 17
EUROCRIMINOLOGY 119, 122 (1998).
77. See Herrmann, supra note 14, at 63.
78. See id. at 67.
79. See LEIGH & ZEDNER, supra note 9, at 41. Wassermann speaks of a boycott and
even a sabotage of the criminal procedure. Rudolf Wasserman, Von der Schwierigkeit,
Strafverfahren in angemessener Zeit durch Urteil abzuschliessen [The Difficulty of Concluding the
Criminal Procedure through Judgment without Undue Delay ], 1994 NJW 1106.
80. See GERLACH, supra note 40, at 24.
81. See STPO, Apr. 7, 1987, BGBL. I 1074, as amended, §§ 24, 26.
82. In fact, at trial the defense lawyer has the same dossier as the prosecution and
the court.
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There are many examples of abuses on both sides, and there
are even known cases in which defendants were put under grave
pressure to confess to crimes that they denied having
committed.83 In one case, the lawyer forced the prosecution into
a settlement declaring that he knew that there was a serious basis
for appeal, without revealing the court’s mistake. The prosecutor
had a choice between risking the judgment being reversed by the
appeal court or engaging in negotiations with the defense.84
Unfortunately, the literature has to rely on anecdotal evidence as
there is no systematic empirical research on the extent of severe
abuses.
B.

Content of Agreements

The defendant (usually through his counsel) can offer to
confess to all or parts of the accusations, to testify against a codefendant,85 to waive a motion for the admission of evidence, or
to waive the right to file an appeal.86 In addition, the defendant
might promise to undertake to pay court costs or indemnification
payments87 or to waive his own requests for any compensation.88
As in England and Wales, the center of informal negotiations in
Germany is the confession. However, as in the English discourse
on plea bargaining, an essential question is what effect a
confession should have on the sentence.
It is generally accepted that a remorseful confession should
generate a sentence reduction. In the case of an informal
agreement, however, it is more likely that the cause for the
confession is the expected sentence reduction rather than true
remorse. Schmidt-Hieber argues that the possibility of remorse is
at least not ruled out and that one should account for the
principle of in dubio pro reo.89 Schünemann counters that the
83.
84.
85.
86.

See Herrmann, supra note 14, at 77.
See Deal, supra note 20, at 548.
See BRAUN, supra note 62, at 6.
For the question of the extent to which such a waiver is binding, see infra p.

318.
87. See BRAUN, supra note 62, at 6.
88. See Chritstoph Rückel, Verteidigertaktik bei Verständigungen und Vereinbarungen im
Strafverfahren—Mit Checkliste [Defender Tactics in Negotiations and Agreements in Criminal
Proceedings—With Checklist], 1987 NSTZ 297, 303.
89. Werner Schmidt-Hieber, Der strafprozessuale „Vergleich“—eine Illegale Kungelei?
[Criminal Procedure “Settlement”—Illegal Wheeling and Dealing?], 1986 STV 355, 356
[hereinafter Schidt-Hieber, Vergleich]. Otherwise, so he claims, there would be acting
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confession in this case depends on the offer of an advantage and
therefore cannot indicate unconditional remorse.90 On the other
hand, Schmidt-Hieber stresses that even without remorse the
confession’s value for establishing the facts is sufficient for
mitigating the sentence.91 Moreover, the Federal High Court of
Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) has held that a confession is a
mitigating factor, even if it is given primarily for tactical
reasons.92 Additionally, according to Widmaier, the ethical effort
of admitting to the offence in front of the court, the public, and
to oneself should be rewarded.93 On the other hand, especially in
the areas of financial, environmental, and similar crimes,
defendants cannot be absolutely convinced of their
blameworthiness because the question often does not depend on
the facts (as in traditional crime) but rather on definitions and
interpretation of the elements of the offence by the courts.94 To
express deep remorse is difficult under these circumstances.
Even more pressing is the relationship between confession
and truth. As was shown earlier, the principle of substantive truth
dictates that the judge examine every confession as to its
truthfulness and consider additional evidence if needed.
However, research reveals that informal agreements drastically
undermine this principle. When Schünemann asked judges
whether they would accept a confession even in a situation where
the trial had not brought up enough evidence for a conviction,
seventy-two percent showed themselves ready to accept the
confession and to take it as the only basis for conviction.95 The
principle of substantive truth is considerably undermined further
if an informal agreement consists of a so-called “slim confession,”
which means that the defendant only confirms the already known
evidence rather than revealing any new facts.96 This kind of
skills at play in trials. Werner Schmidt-Hieber, Absprachen im Strafprozeß—Rechtsbeugung
und Klassenjustiz? [Informal Agreements in the Criminal Process—Perversion of Justice and
Class Justice?], 1990 DRIZ 321, 321 [hereinafter Schidt-Hieber, Absprachen im Strafprozeß].
90. SCHÜNEMANN, supra note 48, at B112.
91. Schmidt-Hieber, Vergleich, supra note 89, at 356.
92. See BGH Aug. 8, 1997, 28 JURISTISCHE RUNDSCHAU [JR] 245 (248), 1998.
93. Widmaier, supra note 22, at 358.
94. See BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 76.
95. SCHÜNEMANN, supra note 48, at B23; see also Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher
Regional Court] Jan. 24, 1989, BREMEN [StV] 145, 1989 (presiding judge admitted not
having read the file before initiating negotiations with the defendant).
96. See SCHÜNEMANN, supra note 48, at B83.

312 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34:296
confession is usually formulated by the defense counsel97 and
then is just confirmed by the defendant. Defendants favor slim
confessions because they avoid having to release details, that
might bring about a harsher sentence or be used in a civil action
by the victim.98 The court too might favor a less elaborate
statement of the facts because more details of the crime could
lead to suspicion among the public who might not understand
the mild sentence or probationary custody.99 In this respect, the
argument that a confession deserves a sentence reduction
because it facilitates fact-finding is no longer applicable.
The second form of offer by the defendant is to waive or
withdraw a motion for the admission of evidence in order to
shorten the proceeding.100 The defense might also agree not to
challenge the admission of certain evidence by the prosecution
or the court.101 In this way, defendants renounce a considerable
part of their procedural rights. Sometimes the defense offers
additional remedies, such as a promise to improve the
environmental protection at its factory or to waive administrative
procedures.
Most informal settlements also include the waiver of the
right to file an appeal.102 Although any promise to waive the right
to appeal made by the defendant before the final conviction is
not legally binding,103 it is only rarely broken. Even though there
are legal remedies against a sentence based on an informal
settlement, defendants rarely use these. There are three possible
reasons why defendants do not challenge the conviction. First,
they may be satisfied with the outcome to which they have
agreed. Second, they might be reluctant to spend more time,
money, and effort on another process. The third and most
serious reason is that the defense counsel might not have
informed the client about the legal remedies against the

97. The defense counsel chooses the formulations carefully in order to avoid any
civil action.
98. See SCHÜNEMANN, supra note 48, at B83.
99. See id. at B26.
100. See BRAUN, supra note 62, at 6.
101. See Schmidt-Hieber, supra note 44, at 1017.
102. See Küpper & Bode, supra note 12, at 353.
103. See Herrmann, supra note 14, at 75.
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settlement, or even about the existence of the agreement itself,
which counsel negotiated on its own.104
Besides a dismissal or a penal order, the prime offer the
prosecution can make to the defendant is to recommend a lower
sentence to the court.105 As in England and Wales, the result of a
settlement can also be downgrading the charge, e.g., from
attempted manslaughter to serious injury106 or from perpetrator
to abettor.107 However, the court is not bound “by the offense’s
evaluation which formed the basis of the order opening the main
proceedings.”108 This means that if the evidence during the
hearing shows that an act has to be evaluated as the higher
charge the court has to convict accordingly. If, however, the
court accepts a slim confession without further investigation it
will not have any indication that a higher charge might be more
appropriate.
In addition to a sentence reduction, the accused might be
offered release from custody109 or other coercive measures.110
Also, the exclusion of the public from the hearing can be offered
in order to maintain the defendant’s privacy and professional
reputation. Especially in white-collar crimes, the publicity of a
criminal procedure can cause serious financial losses owing to
the damaged reputation of the defendant or his business. Since
the public can only be excluded from the court hearing if the
requirements of section 169ff of the Courts Constitution Act111
are met, informal strategies, such as the scheduling of the trial
for late afternoon, or not passing information to the judicial
press service, are used to avoid an audience in the court room.112

104. See Schünemann, supra note 31, at 1900.
105. See Herrmann, supra note 14, at 68. On the duty of the prosecutor to
recommend a sentence to the judge, see JULIA ALISON FIONDA, PUBLIC PROSECUTORS
AND DISCRETION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 148 (1995).
106. See Herrmann, supra note 14, at 63.
107. See Hassemer & Hippler, supra note 12, at 360.
108. See STPO, Apr. 7, 1987, BGBL. I 1074, as amended, § 264.
109. See Schmidt-Hieber, supra note 44, at 1017.
110. See BRAUN, supra note 62, at 6.
111. Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz [GVG][Courts Constitution Act], Sept. 12, 1950,
BGBL. I at 1077.
112. See BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 18.
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C. Criticisms
The main criticism regarding plea bargaining is not that the
accused is unduly pressured, as is claimed in England and
Wales.113 Although such cases might occur, there is no evidence
that this happens more than just exceptionally. Until last year,
the largest part of the academic discourse instead dealt with the
question of whether informal agreements are reconcilable with
the German Constitution, the general principles of criminal
procedure, and certain provisions of the Criminal Procedure
Code and the Penal Code.114 Principles that were claimed to have
been infringed are: the presumption of innocence, the right to a
fair trial, the right to a lawful judge, the right to judicial hearing,
the principle of public trial, the principle of substantive truth
and court investigation, the principles of immediacy and orality,
the privilege against self-incrimination, the principle of
compulsory prosecution, the duty of presence of the accused,
and the prohibition of undue pressure.115
Whereas most academics held informal settlements to be an
illegal practice, most practitioners were convinced of their
compatibility with the German legal system.116 Even though in
the early 1980s the topic of informal case dispositions was
considered explosive and disreputable,117 many authors ascribed
legality to this practice long before the introduction of the new
legislation in 2009. The main points can only be summarized
here, but it is evident that the discourse very much resembled the
plea bargaining debate in Anglo-American criminal justice
systems. The main arguments supporting the legality of informal
agreements were that the Criminal Procedure Code did not
forbid them expressly, that there were other provisions which
allowed negotiations, that a decision based on consensus helped
113. MICHAEL MCCONVILLE ET AL., STANDING ACCUSED: THE ORGANISATION AND
PRACTICES OF CRIMINAL DEFENCE LAWYERS IN BRITAIN 63–64 (1994).
114. See Thomas Swenson, The German “Plea Bargaining” Debate, PACE INT’L L. REV.
373, 383, 393, 400–01 (1995).
115. It is also discussed that courtroom actors engaging in informal agreements
might commit offenses themselves. It is argued that participating professionals might
violate section 336 (perversion of justice), sections 258 and 258a (preventing
prosecution of a guilty person), or section 240 (duress) of the Penal Code. Likewise the
betrayal of the client’s interests (section 356) and breach of the duty to observe secrecy
(section 203) are discussed in the literature. See id. at 425.
116. See Herrmann, supra note 26, at 775.
117. See BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 48.
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to achieve a fair and accepted outcome, and that the practice
had been so well established that it was not reversible anyway.118
The major arguments against informal procedures were
that, as long as the Criminal Procedure Code did not allow them
explicitly, they were illegal, that they violated most major
principles of the criminal process, that they compromised the
role of the trial, and that they led to arbitrary results with a class
bias.119 Although informal negotiations played a vital role in
Germany’s criminal justice system for at least forty years, the
literature shows that the legality of informal agreements was
highly contested in relation to numerous principles and
provisions. It is interesting to observe how many arguments some
authors have advanced to show that informal procedures are
legal,120 while before 1982 no one doubted their illegality. Only
after it was no longer possible to deny that informal negotiations
were more than rare exceptions were justifications sought.121
Otherwise, one would have had to recognize and admit that
judges made wide-scale use of illegal means.122
Unfortunately, the discussion of legality failed to address
broader questions, such as the actual balance of judicial and
legislative power in Germany, the relation between work quotas
and law obedience, the role of legal principles and values, and
the relationship between substantive and procedural criminal
law. Rather, the debate concentrated exclusively on the question
of legality and the need for regulation. This gap in the discussion
is regrettable because, as is argued below, it seems very
questionable whether legislation can heal the rift between the
traditional theoretical principles of the formal German criminal
procedure and the new informal practice that is created to
shortcut this procedure.

118. See generally RALF TSCHERWINKA, ABSPRACHEN IM STRAFPROZEß [AGREEMENTS
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS] (1995) (discussing the arguments supporting the legality of
informal agreements).
119. See Swenson, supra note 114, at 400.
120. See TSCHERWINKA, supra note 118.
121. See BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 90 (“The knowledge of the existence and the
significance of an informal practice changed its legal interpretation.”).
122. See id. at 126–27. This is even supported in many other areas of law, such as
civil law or administrative law, where agreements are legal.
IN
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IV. ATTEMPTED RESTRICTIONS BY COURT RULINGS
In financial crimes, informal settlements have been carried
out for years despite of the fact that all participants were aware
that the Federal High Court of Justice would not accept this
practice.123 Since a crucial part of the agreement is usually the
waiver of the right of appeal, only a handful of higher court
rulings dealt with informal settlements. But because of an
increasing number of failed agreements (usually claiming a
violation of the principle of freedom from coercion under
section 136a)124 the Federal High Court of Justice and even the
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) (“Court”)
were eventually forced to provide some rulings on this practice.125
The first landmark decision was delivered by the Federal
Constitutional Court in 1987 when the appellant claimed that his
constitutional rights were violated.126 In the preliminary
procedure, the Court denied having jurisdiction over the present
case about an informal agreement as it could not identify any
drastic violation of constitutional rights.127 The Court held that
negotiations outside the court in which the negotiating parties
discuss the prognosis of the case were not generally forbidden as
long as the law was respected.128 In this case there was no
violation of any procedural law because the presentation of
evidence at trial was nearly completed and the final sentence was
commensurate with the offender’s guilt.129 In addition, the Court
stated that the free choice of the defendant had not been
unlawfully violated.130 However, like the UK Court of Appeal in
Turner,131 the Federal Constitutional Court established a set of
123. See id. at 128.
124. Section 136a of the Code of Criminal Procedure states:
The accused’s freedom to make up his mind and to manifest his will shall not
be impaired by ill-treatment, induced fatigue, physical interference,
administration of drugs, torment, deception or hypnosis. Coercion may be
used only as far as this is permitted by criminal procedure law. Threatening
the accused with measures not permitted under its provisions or holding out
the prospect of an advantage not envisaged by statute shall be prohibited.
STPO, Apr. 7, 1987, RGBL. 1074, as amended, § 136a.
125. For a summary see Swenson, supra note 114, at 419.
126. BGH Jan. 27, 1987, NSTZ 419, 1987.
127. 9 NSTZ 419 (419).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. R v. Turner, [1970] 2 Q.B. 321 at 326–27 (Eng.).
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rules under which informal settlements could be accepted.132 All
participants have to be involved, and any negotiations, including
their contents, have to be set out in the main trial hearing.133 The
settlement must not include any ultra vires promises and the
agreed outcome must be lawful and justifiable.134 Further,
although the agreement is not binding, there must be no
divergence without reason.135 Finally, following the principle of
substantive truth, the defendant’s confession has to be examined
by the court to determine if it is genuine.136 In setting out these
limitations, the court seemed to acknowledge the general validity
of informal settlements.137 However, opponents have pointed out
that only in these very restricted circumstances would
negotiations be allowed; the majority of informal settlements
would fall outside these limits and are therefore illegal.
The Federal High Court of Justice passed a number of
confusing rulings regarding specific aspects of informal
agreements without, however, addressing whether the practice in
general was permissible. In 1989, the court held that the trial
judge was allowed to contact the parties outside the courtroom,
but it did not deal with the question of whether this contact
could amount to any negotiations with the parties.138 The court
made clear that if the trial court raised certain sentence
expectations, the defendant could rely on them, but it was not
clear whether the trial court was allowed to raise such
expectations in the first place.139 In a 1990 tax evasion case the
court held that the prosecution’s offer to drop some charges if
the defendant accepted a penal order would not preclude
proceedings against the withdrawn charges later but would be
considered mitigating circumstances.140 In another case decided
the same year,141 the court again avoided dealing explicitly with
the legality of informal settlements in general, but held that in
the present case the judges had been biased because they
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

BRAUN, supra note 62, at 128.
See id.
See id.
See Swenson, supra note 114, at 399.
See id.
See id. at 419.
See BGH June 7, 1989, NJW 2270 (2271), 1989.
Id.
BGH June 7, 1989, NJW 1924, 1990.
BGH July 4, 1990, NJW 3030 (3031), 1990.
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negotiated with the two co-defendants but not with the appellant,
who was not informed about the settlement. One year later, the
court declared that informal agreements contradict the rule of
law,142 and in another decision that year, it clarified that the
agreement does not bind the trial court, as this could render
judges biased.143 Further, it criticized the practice of informal
negotiations in the strongest terms.144 Any informal contact
should be limited to “feeling out” the parties, without dealing
with questions of sentencing or probation.145 However, only a
couple of months later a different Senate146 of the same court
disallowed an informal settlement for specific reasons, rather
than reasoning that they were generally impermissible.147 In 1993
it was confirmed that extra-trial settlements would not necessarily
prejudice the court’s judgment.148
The decisions of the Federal High Court of Justice on the
practice of informal negotiations have been ambiguous and the
interpretations have been consequently debated.149 The court
seemed to oscillate between criminal procedural principles on
the one hand and the pragmatic necessity of informal
agreements on the other. In an obiter dictum the court stated the
incompatibility of informal settlements with the legal system,150
but made a contrary ruling soon after.151 It explained that the
solution lay in a linguistic distinction between illegal
“accordance”
(Absprache)
and
legal
“understanding”
(Verständigungen), but the court did not provide any criteria to
distinguish between the two forms in practice.152
In a landmark decision in 1997, the Fourth Senate of the
Federal High Court of Justice declared that informal settlements
were “not prohibited” if they were within certain limits.153 The
142. BGH Sept. 24, 1990, NSTZ 348, 1991.
143. See BGH Jan. 23, 1991, NJW 1692 (1693), 1991.
144. See id. at 1694.
145. See id.
146. The Federal High Court of Justice is divided into five chambers called Senates.
147. BGH Oct. 30, 1991, 8 NJW 519, 1992.
148. BGH Oct. 19, 1993, 19 NJW 1293, 1994.
149. See Küpper & Bode, supra note 12, at 395.
150. BGH Oct. 30, 1991, 37 BGHST 298, 1991.
151. BGH Oct. 19, 1993, 4 NSTZ 153 (196), 1994.
152. Id.
153. BGH Aug. 28, 1997, NJW 86, 1998 (where the defendant was charged with a
hundred counts of sexual abuse and rape).
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negotiation has to take place after the trial has started, although
discussions in the course of preparation are allowed if the result
is revealed during the main trial;154 all participants (including codefendants) have to be informed; and the trial court is not
relieved of its obligation to find the objective truth and thus has
to investigate the credibility of the confession. As a consequence,
the determination of guilt of any offense must not be part of the
negotiation. Further, a confession made as part of the informal
negotiation has a mitigating effect, but the court is not allowed to
indicate the exact sentence. However, it is permissible to indicate
the maximum penalty that could be expected. Threats or undue
promises are forbidden. The same is true for a waiver of the right
to appeal by the defense.155 As will be shown later, it is especially
the last rule that is generally disregarded in practice.156
Since this decision, the Federal High Court of Justice
repeatedly emphasized that although the practice of informal
negotiations was developed praetor legem, it is now a necessary
part of the German criminal justice system and thus permissible
within the restrictions of the 1997 decision.157 However, these
guidelines were met with incomprehension by the legal
community, which felt that the guidelines would not address
their concerns. The restrictive limits of the ruling did not reflect
the practice of informal negotiations and practitioners felt that
the Federal High Court of Justice was too remote from the day-today work of trial courts to understand the practical necessities.
The 1997 decision did not prove to be the final clarifying
decision for which many had been waiting. Seven years later,
there were still discrepancies between the five criminal Senates of
the Federal High Court of Justice regarding informal
agreements.158 In 2004, the Federal High Court of Justice
154. Id.
155. Joachim Herrmann, Rechtliche Strukturen für Absprachen in der
Hauptverhandlung. Die Richtlinienentscheidung des Bundesgerichtshofs—BGHSt 43, 195
[Legal Structures for Agreements in the Criminal Trial. The Policy Decision of the Federal
Court—43, 195], 12 JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG [JUS] 1162 (1999). For a critique of this
decision, see Thomas Weigend, Eine Prozeßordnung für abgesprochene Urteile [A Code of
Procedure for Negotiated Judgments], 2 NSTZ 57 (1999).
156. Helmut Satzger & Kai Höltkemeier, Zur Unwirksamkeit eines abgesprochenen
Rechtsmittelverzichts [The Ineffectiveness of a Negotiated Waiver of Appeal], 2004 NJW 2487.
157. BGH Oct. 29, 2003, 18 NJW 1273 (1335), 2004.
158. See, e.g., BGH Feb. 19, 2004, 50 BGHST 84, 2005; BGH Mar. 13, 2003, 50
BGHST 161, 2004.
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examined the validity of waivers of appeal as part of the
agreement.159 The Joint Senate confirmed once again the general
permissibility of informal agreements within the guidelines of the
1997 decision,160 but limited the waiver of appeal.161 The court
made clear that if the judgment is based on an informal
agreement, any waiver of appeal by the defendant was not
binding unless the defendant has been informed by the court
that he or she was not bound by any promises to waive the right
to appeal made previously as part of the agreement (the so-called
“qualified information”).162 Moreover, the court declared that
“the limits of judicial lawmaking” had been reached, and called
for action by the legislature.163
V. THE NEW LEGISLATION
On May 28, 2009, the German Federal Parliament followed
the call of the Federal High Court of Justice by passing the Bill
for the Regulation of Agreements in the Criminal Procedure,
which formalizes agreements during the criminal trial.164 Except
for some minor changes, the legislation largely follows the
guidelines set out by the Federal High Court of Justice. A new
section, 257c,165 was added to the German Criminal Procedure
Code, to allow for and regulates agreements without—so it is
claimed166—infringing on the principles of the German criminal
procedure.167
The new provision regulates the agreement between the
court, the prosecution, and the defense.168 An agreement
becomes valid when the court announces the possible content of
the agreement and both the prosecution and defense consent.169
The legal status of agreements that have been made before or
outside of trial is unclear. Section 160b allows for
159. BGH June 15, 2004, NJW 2536, 2004.
160. BGH Mar. 3, 2005, 50 BGHST 40 (47), 2005.
161. Id.
162. In German, qualifizierte Belehrung.
163. 50 BGHSt 40 (64).
164. DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN UND PROTOKOLLE [BT] 16/12310
165. This is the focus of the new regulation. Other provisions that were changed or
added are: sections 35a, 44, 160b, 202a, 212, 243, 257b, 267, 273, 302. Id.
166. BT 16/13095.
167. Id. at 1–3.
168. STPO, Apr. 7, 1987, BGBL. I at 1074, as amended, § 257c.
169. Id. § 257c(3).
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communications between prosecution and defense before trial
(“if they appear to be suitable to further the proceedings”) which
need to be read into the record,170 but it is unclear whether
binding agreements between the prosecution and defense
without the involvement of the court are prohibited, or simply
not part of the new regulation.
The new provision is aimed at preserving the principle of
substantive truth. Only if the court is convinced that the offense
has been fully investigated and there are grounds for believing
that the admission of guilt is genuine can the judgment follow.
This confirms the Federal High Court of Justice ruling that a
mere “formal admission” (in which the defendant only admits
guilt but does not make any statement about the facts) does not
suffice for a judgment.171 It follows that the settlement must not
include an agreement about a determination of guilt.172 This
provision also excludes any negotiations that in the common-law
system would be called charge bargaining. However, charge
bargaining between prosecution and defense very likely occurs
before the trial. It has been shown that negotiations about
different charges are invaluable to both defense and prosecution,
and it is very questionable whether section 257c(2) will be able to
end these kinds of negotiations.173
All negotiations before and during trial have to be
announced during the main trial hearing and read into the
record.174 The recording of all negotiations and agreements
promotes transparency and ensures that all arrangements can be
revised by an appellate court. According to the new section
273(1a), even the absence of any agreement needs to be
recorded.175 This is an important step to move “plea bargaining”
out of the shadows of informality and into the field of regulated,
transparent, and controllable formal procedure.
To ensure the principle of fair trial and protect the
defendant, section 257c(4) mandates that unless new facts
emerge (be they related to the crime itself or the behavior of the
defendant after the agreement), the trial court is bound by its
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

See id.
See BGH Jan. 26, 2006, 3 STRASFSENAT [STR] 415/02, 2006.
See STPO, Apr. 7, 1987, BGBL. I at 1074, as amended, § 257c.
See supra discussion in Part II.
See STPO, Apr. 7, 1987, BGBL. I at 1074, as amended, § 273.
See id.
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initial prognosis of punishment.176 This stipulation protects
defendant expectations but ensures that the final sentence
reflects the known facts and not merely the agreement. If the
trial court feels that it cannot sentence according to its initial
sentence prognosis the admission of guilt cannot be used as
evidence. This rule attempts to restore the status quo, particularly
the presumption of innocence, that existed before the
agreement. However, it will be very difficult for the trial court177
to disregard a confession after it has previously accepted it, which
it can only do if it was convinced, according to the concept of
substantive truth, that it was genuine. One can easily imagine a
situation where the defendant submits a credible confession that
concurs with other evidence but later new aggravating facts arise
and the trial court cannot justify its initial indication of
maximum sentence. In this case the agreement falls apart, the
court is not bound by its promise, and the defendant’s confession
is presumed not to have been made. It is not realistic to expect
the court to disregard a confession which it was convinced was
true simply because additional aggravating facts have arisen. Even
if the court is able to disregard completely the earlier credible
admission of guilt, if the defendant is convicted it will be hard for
him as well as the public to believe that the court was not
prejudiced by the previous confession.
The second central aspect of the new law concerns the
waiver of appeal. Following the guidelines of the Federal High
Court of Justice, according to sections 35a and 302(1), a waiver of
appeal must not be part of any agreement.178 Further, whenever a
judgment involves an agreement, any waiver of appeal (even if it
was not part of the agreement) is only valid if the defendant has
received the qualified information explained above.179 This
means if a case involves an agreement and the defendant waives
his right to appeal, the court has to explain to the defendant that
if this waiver was part of the deal, the court is no longer bound by
it.180 Only if the defendant adheres to the waiver after being thus
informed by the court does it become valid. The aim of this strict

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

See id. at § 257c.
There is no jury in the German trial.
See STPO, Apr. 7, 1987, BGBL. I at 1074, as amended, §§ 35a, 302.
See id.
See id. §§ 257c, 302.
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rule is to ensure that agreements are open to revision by the
appellate courts. The hope is that this judiciary control will
guarantee that all agreements are within the legal boundaries
and thus establish legitimacy for this practice.
However, like the Federal High Court of Justice before it,
the legislature has overlooked the flaw of this reasoning. The
waiver of an appeal by the defendant has potentially two
invaluable benefits for the trial judge. First, without the prospect
of an appeal, the judgment does not need to be formulated with
the same care as if it were open to review by a higher court.
Second, every appeal is a challenge to the rightfulness and
quality of the judge’s decision. The fewer cases of an individual
judge that are reviewed by a higher court, the fewer decisions are
overruled, which is important for the judge’s career appraisals.
The defense lawyer, too, is unlikely to pursue an appeal that will
damage the trust-based working relationship with the court and
the prosecutor, and might threaten future negotiations. Thus a
judicial review of cases based on informal agreements is not in
the interest of the practitioners, and it does not come as a
surprise that this rule was regularly disregarded. It is more than
questionable whether the new legislation will be able to change
this.
Another problem related to the waiver of appeal is the time
limit for the defendant. If the defendant declares a waiver of
appeal without receiving the qualified information and then
decides to appeal after all, he can do so only within the ordinary
time limits for appeals, which is one week after pronouncement
of the judgment.181 The Federal High Court of Justice explicitly
ruled that the time limit cannot be extended for defendants who
have entered an agreement because this would put them in a
better position than defendants who have not participated in a
settlement.182 In practice this means that defendants who are not
informed by the court that they are not bound by their initial
waiver of appeal can only file an appeal if they find out that their
initial waiver is invalid within one week after the judgment. If the
court and defense counsel agree to a settlement which illegally
includes a waiver of appeal, it is doubtful that they will later
inform the defendant that this part of the deal is not binding. As
181. See id. at § 341.
182. See BGH June 25, 2008, STR 246, 2008.
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was argued before, an appeal is not in the interest of any of the
courtroom actors. The future will show if courts will take
advantage of this loophole. Marsch guesses that the waiver of
appeal will not end, but rather will only be made invisible.183
Considering what little impact the rulings of the Federal
High Court of Justice had on the practice of informal
negotiations, the main question is whether the new legislation
(which adds little substance to the existing practice) will be
followed by the courtroom actors. Since the debate over informal
agreements started in Germany, calls for legislative regulation of
the practice have been voiced. It was argued that the legislature
needed to regulate the practice and make it more formal so that
courtroom actors would no longer need to act outside the
Criminal Procedure Code. However, Nestler-Tremel pointed out
that legality was only a theoretical problem, for in practice the
defendant usually waived the right to appeal and thus withdrew
the negotiations from any formal control.184 Besides, informal
settlements were carried out long before practitioners even dared
to admit it. Even if proponents later argued that informal
agreements would fit into the German criminal law system,
initially the participants did not believe them to be legal but used
them on a regular basis nevertheless.185 If the judiciary developed
its own system believing the procedure to be illegal, it is doubtful
they would now accept regulations and restrictions.186 MeyerGoßner even declared that informal agreements “are going to
shape the legal everyday life with or without legislation.”187
Schünemann, on the other hand, disapproved of this viewpoint
and called it an unrealistic insult to the German judiciary.188
However, the development of relevant legislation supports
Meyer-Goßner’s view. The dismissal was repeatedly extended
by the legislature to follow the praetor legem development of
the informal practice by the judiciary.189 Bussmann’s research
183. Marsch, supra note 8.
184. Cornelius Nestler-Tremel, Der „Deal“ aus der Perspektive des Beschuldigten [The
“Deal” from the Perspective of the Accused], 1989 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ [KJ] 448.
185. See Herrmann, supra note 14, at 57.
186. See Wolfgang Siolek, Neues Zum Thema Verständgung im Strafverfahren [New
Comments on the Subject of Agreements in Criminal Proceedings], 1993 DRIZ 427, 428.
187. Meyer-Großner, supra note 2.
188. SCHÜNEMANN, supra note 48, at B159.
189. See supra Part I.
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confirmed that the question of legality did not play a notable role
for legal professionals.190 The practitioners were led by quotidian
requirements rather than by the formal law, and consequently
they were not particularly concerned about whether the question
of law should be changed.191 It was not so much that the
practitioners suppressed the praxis-law conflict, but rather that
the formal law played an inferior role in the daily practice. When
considering whether to initiate an informal negotiation,
participants calculate its benefits and drawbacks, rather than its
compatibility with the law.192 Thus formal law is replaced by an
informal but established code of conduct.193 Widmaier made the
reality of the practice very clear: “Settlements in criminal
procedure do exist. They do not need to be first legalised, nor
can they be prohibited.”194
Drawing conclusions from this experience, it is very
questionable whether the courtroom actors will adapt their
practice-driven customs to the limits of section 257c. MeyerGoßner points out that judges and prosecutors are less likely to
ignore legislation than judge-made law because they could
commit the criminal offense of perversion of justice according to
section 339 German Penal Code.195 However, this threat seems
not to have been strong enough to prevent the judiciary and
prosecutors from developing extensive informal practices outside
the law of dismissal and penal order in the first place.196 Since the
appeals courts have developed the rules which have now become
written law, it must be expected that appeals courts will support
the new legislation, but of course they will only have the
opportunity to do so if the trial courts use agreements openly.
The future will reveal whether the new legislation will
succeed in lifting the agreements out of informality into the
realm of formal procedure. This author has serious doubts about
whether the formalization of a practice which derives its
attraction from its informality can be realized.

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

BUSSMAN, supra note 16, at 219.
Id.
See Nestler-Tremel, supra note 184, at 448.
See BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 141.
Widmaier, supra note 22, at 357.
Meyer-Großner, supra note 2, at 190.
See supra Part III.
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VI. THE CHASM BETWEEN THEORETICAL VALUES AND
PRACTICAL NECESSITIES
As in England and Wales, the merits of informal
negotiations for the German criminal process are highly
contested. Whereas most practitioners praise the usefulness and
even the necessity of informal procedures, many academics point
out that this practice is not compatible with the basic values of
the German criminal justice system. But there is a third essential
theme which is missing in the debate. This Article argues that the
development of informal procedures in Germany, as with plea
bargaining in England and other common-law systems, leads to
the development of an informal system which runs parallel to the
formal process with neither higher courts nor legislation being
able to prevent or control it. This opens questions not only about
the power of the judiciary in general, but also about whose role it
is to close the chasm between theoretical values and practical
necessities in general. The legislature in Germany had the
opportunity to engage in a debate about the tension between the
two, but unfortunately did not address this question at all.
It has been argued above that the core reason for the start of
informal settlements in Germany was the change in the nature of
the substantive criminal law without adaptation of the procedural
law. Both the German Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure
Code date from the nineteenth century when crimes were
comparatively simple to define and generally corresponded to
the understanding of an average person. In modern society, with
the increasing introduction of crimes that cause danger (rather
than harm), common sense is no longer sufficient to establish
the boundary between permissible and criminal conduct.197 The
main question is often not the identity of the offender, but
whether an offense was committed in the first place. The conduct
of the accused need not be identified, but rather interpreted. For
example, the trial court might not need to establish whether the
defendant has transferred money, but whether this transaction
amounted to money laundering. This means criminal law has
been extended to offenses that do not fit under the conventional
197. See Rolf-Peter Calliess, Strafzwecke und Strafrecht—40 Jahre Grundgesetz—
Entwicklungstendenzen vom freiheitlichen zum sozial-autoritären Rechtsstaat? [Sentencing Goals
and Criminal Law—40 Years Constitution—Developing Tendencies from Liberal to SocialAuthoritarian Constitutional State], 1989 NJW 1338, 1340.
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criminal procedure law. Not surprisingly, the courtroom actors
have had to adapt their way of handling these cases and court
behavior has become less characteristic of criminal law and more
typical of administrative law:
Through giving up the punitive, repressive paradigm in
favour of an economic paradigm and abandonment of
hierarchical, authoritarian forms of interaction in favour of
cooperative, consent orientated forms of process, criminal
procedures become increasingly similar to administrative law
procedures,
solving
conflicts
of
interests . . . by
negotiation.198

Hence, legal practice finds itself in a quandary between, on
the one hand, formal procedural law that is still oriented toward
the principle of material truth, and on the other hand,
substantive criminal law, which blurs the boundaries between
allowed behavior and criminal conduct, and thus pushes towards
formal truth on which the participants agree. As certain
behaviors were transferred to the more repressive criminal law,
the criminal trial itself was replaced by informal negotiations
where the offender can now negotiate and avoid public
stigmatization. The fact that more and more offenses have been
transferred from administrative law into criminal law in order to
exercise more repressive control on white-collar crime ironically
has had the effect that criminal courts increasingly might replace
the trial with less repressive, consensus-oriented negotiations.
While this is welcome in most cases by the defendant and all
courtroom actors, it disregards the interest of the public in
proportionate punishment and fair labeling of the crime. “The
increasing restructuring of criminal law from a device of citizen
protection into a flexible mechanism of state intervention is the
wrong answer to the right question of how social risks can be
dealt with.”199
Rather than formally measuring the new substantive law
against the traditional core values of criminal procedure and
adapting one to the other, it has been left to the courtroom
actors to square this circle. As in England and Wales, Germany’s
two law systems, i.e., the formal trial and the informal case

198. BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 27.
199. Calliess, supra note 197, at 1338.
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disposition, started to work alongside each other.200 This
development is easier to accept in common-law systems as judges
are allowed and indeed asked to develop law. In civil-law
countries, too, the development of customary law is
acknowledged to some degree. Herrmann holds that criminal
justice is a “living organism” and hence it is possible to develop it
against the law.201 Also, Schünemann regards the increasing use
of informal settlements in Germany as a form of development of
customary law.202 However, the development of customary law
finds its limits in the fundamental principle of law and the rule of
law. And as was shown above, the legality of informal agreements
was always highly contested.
But there is a more fundamental problem with informal
criminal procedures, i.e., the consequences of the duality of
systems. When two systems exist side by side, the crucial question
is, who has the power to decide which system is used in which
case and which criteria are taken into account in this decision?
The main argument of the proponents of plea bargaining in
England and Wales and informal agreements in Germany is that
the defendant has the choice between safeguards and sanction
reduction. However, this argument has two crucial flaws: first,
defendants often do not have the necessary information to make
this rational decision. They lack insight into the practices and
routines of the court, they have no access to the prosecutor’s
files, and it is seldom possible for a lay person to evaluate the
strength of the prosecutor’s evidence, especially in large-scale
procedures. As a consequence, defendant will be dependent on
the decisions made by the lawyers, who have their own interests
in mind. Second, even if the defendants themselves have a
choice, the divergence from a formal trial silences both the
public (who are denied an audience at trial and whose interests
are no longer represented by the prosecution, who again follow
their own interests) and the victim. In both adversarial and
inquisitorial criminal justice systems, it is the legal professionals
who decide which cases are “worthy” of a full trial and which are
to be disposed of informally. However, there are no guidelines
on the criteria for this decision, and it seems that this is an area
200. See BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 20.
201. Herrmann, supra note 26, at 773.
202. SCHÜNEMANN, supra note 31, at 1896.
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of absolute, uncontrolled discretion.203 As was shown above, the
criteria of selecting cases for plea negotiations are very random
and more related to the characteristics of the defendant than the
interest of the public.
VII. SQUARING THE CIRCLE
Informal agreements have spread so widely to all types of
crime because the work pressure of under-resourced courts and
prosecution offices have reprioritized the values of the criminal
process. It is now the maxim of efficiency that often assumes first
priority in decision making by legal professionals.204 Since
negotiations among professionals have turned out to be much
more efficient than contesting the case, traditional values of fair
trial and proportionate sentencing have to make way for the new
value of “process economy.”205 The new legislation claims to
square the circle of plea bargaining, making it possible to profit
from all the advantages of informal agreements while
simultaneously upholding the main principles of the formal
criminal trial. However, it is doubtful whether the new procedure
can combine the benefits of informal agreements while
preserving the safeguards of the formal procedure. First, the new
legislation focuses on agreements between all parties during the
trial whereas in reality many deals are struck before the main
hearing and are often without the participation of the court.
Thus a great number of negotiations fall outside the scope of the
new legislation. Second, as the confession is not sufficient to
establish the defendant’s guilt, the court is expected to study the
dossier carefully and satisfy itself that there are no legal or factual
obstacles to the agreed outcome.206 The extent to which the
validity of the confession will be examined by the courts remains
to be seen. As one of the main reasons for the development of
informal agreements was the shortening of proceedings, it is
open to question whether courtroom actors are now inclined to
lengthen them. One could argue that a hearing that examines
the validity of the admission of guilt is still shorter than a full
203. And an area that is unresearched for that matter.
204. See Lüdemann & Bussmann, supra note 28, at 68.
205. In German, Prozeßökonomie.
206. Absprachen im Strafprozess—Wirksamkeit eines Rechtsmittelverzichts [Agreements in
Criminal Procedures—The Effectiveness of the Appeal Waiver], 2005 NJW 1440, 1442.
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trial, but experience shows that courtroom actors often do not
feel that they can afford the time to check the validity of the
confession. Thus, with hindsight, it is not surprising that
courtroom actors repeatedly disregarded the Federal High Court
of Justice rulings and continued to extend the use of informal
negotiations. Legislation that reiterates rules that have proven to
be unacceptable to courtroom actors will hardly be able to
change a well-established practice.
Last, but by no means least, the question of appeal, which
opens the practice to supervision of the higher courts, has not
been addressed appropriately by the legislature. There is no
disagreement that undue pressure, be it threats or inappropriate
promises, are forbidden and render any agreement void. The
essential question is how the authenticity of the confession can
be tested. It is the informality of the negotiations, in which the
courtroom actors can speak freely off the record without the risk
of creating grounds for an appeal, that makes informal
negotiations so attractive. The informality is the reason that the
attempts by the Federal High Court of Justice to render
negotiations and agreements more visible were opposed by
practitioners, and waivers of appeals are made regularly part of
settlements. It is doubtful whether this procedure can combine
the benefits of informal agreements while preserving the
safeguards of the formal procedure.
It has been shown throughout this Article that informal
agreements have been developed as a response to the growing
gap between theoretical values of the formal process and the
practical demands on courtroom actors. The development of an
informal practice that has been developed outside the written law
and outside the explicit rulings of both the Federal
Constitutional Court and the Federal High Court of Justice
proves how wide this gap is. On the one hand, substantive
criminal law, which has been used to solve different social
problems since the Penal Code was first written in the nineteenth
century, has changed its function. On the other hand, the notion
of criminal procedure and the role of punishment have shifted.
Neither is reflected in the development of the formal criminal
trial. The irreconcilability of traditional criminal procedure and
modern criminal law seems to be an overlooked side effect of
reforms in substantive criminal law. Considering how much
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weight is given to the core values and how much pride is placed
in the term “rule of law,” a departure from such values has to be
consciously considered. Rather than leaving it to the courts to
cope with the strains of new procedures, the legislature and civil
society have to decide how to reconcile substantive and
procedural criminal justice. The solution for this enormous task
cannot be found in criminal law and criminal procedural law
alone,207 but by taking a broader look on an inter-disciplinary
basis—for example, by considering options such as the
reformation of tax law and accounting law, a re-transfer of
certain offenses to administrative law, and a reconsideration of
the criminalization of certain risk-creating offenses.
The rules that the Federal High Court developed and the
legislature reiterated neither discussed these underlying tensions
nor succeeded in formulating a procedure that would help
courtroom actors serve the demands of both procedural and
substantive criminal law. It seems that both the Federal High
Court of Justice and the legislature assume the problems are
solved as soon as they give the courtroom actors the extra
freedom they are demanding. This approach demonstrates a lack
of understanding of the underlying conflict between the
different demands on the legal practitioners. Although
regulation of previously informal negotiations in criminal law is
welcome, the legislature unfortunately failed to debate the role
of modern criminal law.

207. This is what the main German academic discourse regarding informal
settlements seeks to do.

